2vulnerabilities
- Critical0 (0.0%)
- High1 (50.0%)
- Medium0 (0.0%)
- Moderate1 (50.0%)
- Low0 (0.0%)
next-tinacms-azure
Ecosystem: npm
Downloads: 8.18 K
- 0CriticalAffects 0 versions
- 1HighAffects 1 version
- 0MediumAffects 0 versions
- 1ModerateAffects 1 version
- 0LowAffects 0 versions
Monthly breakdown
- Critical
- High
- Medium
- Moderate
- Low
- 1 vulnerabilities
- Critical: 0
- High: 1
- Medium: 0
- Moderate: 0
- Low: 0
- 1 vulnerabilities
- Critical: 0
- High: 0
- Medium: 0
- Moderate: 1
- Low: 0
Vulnerabilities (2)
Known vulnerabilities affecting next-tinacms-azure, based on data from OSV.
| ID | Severity | Summary | Affected versions | Published | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-g74q-6g2f-874x | High | Tina: [Broken Access Control] letting any TinaCloud user authorize against any self-hosted site## Summary `@tinacms/auth`'s `isAuthorized(req)` decides authorization by validating the caller's bearer token against `https://identity.tinajs.io/v2/apps/${req.query.clientID}/currentUser`, where the `clientID` comes from the request and is never compared to the site's own configured TinaCloud app id. The function answers "is this token a verified user of whatever app the caller named?" instead of "is this token a verified user of THIS site?" Any TinaCloud user can create their own free app, get a valid token for it, and send `?clientID=<their-own-app>` plus `Authorization: <their-own-tok |
| GitHub (opens in a new tab) | |
| GHSA-8mq9-5fw2-5rm4 | Moderate | Tina: Broken Access Control: arbitrary bucket-key write/delete in `next-tinacms-s3` (and sibling production media adapters)## Summary The production media handler shipped by `next-tinacms-s3` (`createMediaHandler` in `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts`) accepts an attacker-chosen `?key=` query parameter and returns an AWS-signed `PutObject` URL whose `Key` is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured `mediaRoot`. The same handler's `DELETE` branch reads `objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1]` and dispatches a `DeleteObjectCommand` for that exact key, again unbounded by `mediaRoot`. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied `authorized()` predicate — i.e. any log |
| GitHub (opens in a new tab) |
- GHSA-g74q-6g2f-874xHighTina: [Broken Access Control] letting any TinaCloud user authorize against any self-hosted site
< 15.0.1
## Summary `@tinacms/auth`'s `isAuthorized(req)` decides authorization by validating the caller's bearer token against `https://identity.tinajs.io/v2/apps/${req.query.clientID}/currentUser`, where the `clientID` comes from the request and is never compared to the site's own configured TinaCloud app id. The function answers "is this token a verified user of whatever app the caller named?" instead of "is this token a verified user of THIS site?" Any TinaCloud user can create their own free app, get a valid token for it, and send `?clientID=<their-own-app>` plus `Authorization: <their-own-tok
CVE: CVE-2026-63506
- GHSA-8mq9-5fw2-5rm4ModerateTina: Broken Access Control: arbitrary bucket-key write/delete in `next-tinacms-s3` (and sibling production media adapters)
< 14.0.4
## Summary The production media handler shipped by `next-tinacms-s3` (`createMediaHandler` in `packages/next-tinacms-s3/src/handlers.ts`) accepts an attacker-chosen `?key=` query parameter and returns an AWS-signed `PutObject` URL whose `Key` is that value, with no check that the key falls under the operator's configured `mediaRoot`. The same handler's `DELETE` branch reads `objectKey = (req.query.media as string[])[1]` and dispatches a `DeleteObjectCommand` for that exact key, again unbounded by `mediaRoot`. Any caller that passes the operator-supplied `authorized()` predicate — i.e. any log
CVE: CVE-2026-59992