2vulnerabilities
- Critical0 (0.0%)
- High0 (0.0%)
- Medium0 (0.0%)
- Moderate1 (50.0%)
- Low1 (50.0%)
neotoma
Ecosystem: npm
Downloads: 963
- 0CriticalAffects 0 versions
- 0HighAffects 0 versions
- 0MediumAffects 0 versions
- 1ModerateAffects 1 version
- 1LowAffects 1 version
Monthly breakdown
- Critical
- High
- Medium
- Moderate
- Low
- 1 vulnerabilities
- Critical: 0
- High: 0
- Medium: 0
- Moderate: 0
- Low: 1
- 1 vulnerabilities
- Critical: 0
- High: 0
- Medium: 0
- Moderate: 1
- Low: 0
Vulnerabilities (2)
Known vulnerabilities affecting neotoma, based on data from OSV.
| ID | Severity | Summary | Affected versions | Published | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-wrr4-782v-jhwh | Low | neotoma has tenant isolation gap in relationship query endpoints## Summary The `/list_relationships` and `/retrieve_graph_neighborhood` endpoints call `getAuthenticatedUserId` (confirming a valid session exists) but do not pass the resolved user ID into the Supabase query as an `.eq("user_id", userId)` filter. As a result, queries return rows from all users rather than scoping to the authenticated caller's data. ## Affected code **`/list_relationships`** (`src/actions.ts`): - Calls `getAuthenticatedUserId` but does not apply `.eq("user_id", userId)` to the relationships query - Uses `.or()` string interpolation for entity ID matching without input valid |
| GitHub (opens in a new tab) | |
| GHSA-5cvp-p7p4-mcx9 | Moderate | Neotoma: Unauthenticated Inspector/API access via reverse-proxy loopback auth bypassNeotoma versions starting at v0.6.0 can treat public reverse-proxied requests as local when the app receives them over a loopback socket and no Bearer token is present. In affected deployments, the REST auth middleware can resolve unauthenticated requests as the local development user, making the hosted Inspector and related API surface reachable without credentials. Impact: unauthorized access to production data exposed through the Inspector/API on affected deployments. Affected condition: a public deployment behind a reverse proxy or same-host tunnel that forwards traffic to the Node proc |
| GitHub (opens in a new tab) |
- GHSA-wrr4-782v-jhwhLowneotoma has tenant isolation gap in relationship query endpoints
>= 0.13.0, < 0.14.0
## Summary The `/list_relationships` and `/retrieve_graph_neighborhood` endpoints call `getAuthenticatedUserId` (confirming a valid session exists) but do not pass the resolved user ID into the Supabase query as an `.eq("user_id", userId)` filter. As a result, queries return rows from all users rather than scoping to the authenticated caller's data. ## Affected code **`/list_relationships`** (`src/actions.ts`): - Calls `getAuthenticatedUserId` but does not apply `.eq("user_id", userId)` to the relationships query - Uses `.or()` string interpolation for entity ID matching without input valid
- GHSA-5cvp-p7p4-mcx9ModerateNeotoma: Unauthenticated Inspector/API access via reverse-proxy loopback auth bypass
>= 0.6.0, < 0.11.1
Neotoma versions starting at v0.6.0 can treat public reverse-proxied requests as local when the app receives them over a loopback socket and no Bearer token is present. In affected deployments, the REST auth middleware can resolve unauthenticated requests as the local development user, making the hosted Inspector and related API surface reachable without credentials. Impact: unauthorized access to production data exposed through the Inspector/API on affected deployments. Affected condition: a public deployment behind a reverse proxy or same-host tunnel that forwards traffic to the Node proc
CVE: CVE-2026-45577