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mockoon-cli

Ecosystem: npm

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Vulnerabilities from the last (months)
  • 0CriticalAffects 0 versions
  • 2HighAffects 2 versions
  • 0MediumAffects 0 versions
  • 1ModerateAffects 1 version
  • 0LowAffects 0 versions
Severity distribution (all time)
3vulnerabilities
  • Critical0 (0.0%)
  • High2 (66.7%)
  • Medium0 (0.0%)
  • Moderate1 (33.3%)
  • Low0 (0.0%)

Monthly breakdown

  • Critical
  • High
  • Medium
  • Moderate
  • Low
  • 2 vulnerabilities
    • Critical: 0
    • High: 1
    • Medium: 0
    • Moderate: 1
    • Low: 0
  • 1 vulnerabilities
    • Critical: 0
    • High: 1
    • Medium: 0
    • Moderate: 0
    • Low: 0

Vulnerabilities (3)

Known vulnerabilities affecting mockoon-cli, based on data from OSV.

Vulnerabilities affecting mockoon-cli
IDSeveritySummaryAffected versionsPublishedSource
GHSA-8wqc-v2q8-vff2Moderate@Mockoon/commons-server: Path traversal in templated `filePath` lets a request escape the served directory (prefix-only base check)## Summary A `FILE` response whose `filePath` embeds request data (e.g. `"/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}"`, the documented way to let the client pick a file) is confined by `getSafeFilePath` with `resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir)`. That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a `../`-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes. An unauthenticated client reads files from sibling paths outside the served directory. ## Details `packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts`, `getSafeFilePath` (line 2315). The static base is the text before the
  • < 9.7.0
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
GHSA-rqx4-3f6q-3x2vHigh@Mockoon/commons-server: Unauthenticated admin API + wildcard CORS allows mock-state hijack and secret theft## Summary Mockoon's admin API ([`commons-server/src/libs/server/admin-api.ts`](https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/blob/4375a8f/packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/admin-api.ts)) is mounted on the same Express listener as the user-defined mock routes, **enabled by default** in every shipped runtime (commons-server, CLI, serverless), serves **`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every endpoint with all HTTP methods allowed including PUT/POST/PATCH/DELETE/PURGE and `Content-Type` in `Access-Control-Allow-Headers`**, and has **zero authentication of any kind** (no token, no shared secret, no
  • < 9.7.0
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
GHSA-w7f9-wqc4-3wxrHighMockoon has a Path Traversal and LFI in the static file serving endpoint### Summary A mock API configuration for static file serving following the same approach presented in the [documentation page](https://mockoon.com/tutorials/create-endpoint-serving-static-file/), where the server filename is generated via templating features from user input is vulnerable to Path Traversal and LFI, allowing an attacker to get any file in the mock server filesystem. The issue may be particularly relevant in cloud hosted server instances ### Details In `sendFileWithCallback`([code](https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/blob/1ed31c4059d7f757f6cb2a43e10dc81b0d9c55a9/packages/commons-
  • < 9.2.0
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
  • GHSA-8wqc-v2q8-vff2Moderate
    @Mockoon/commons-server: Path traversal in templated `filePath` lets a request escape the served directory (prefix-only base check)
    • < 9.7.0
    GitHub (opens in a new tab)

    ## Summary A `FILE` response whose `filePath` embeds request data (e.g. `"/srv/public/{{queryParam 'name'}}"`, the documented way to let the client pick a file) is confined by `getSafeFilePath` with `resolvedPath.startsWith(staticBaseDir)`. That prefix test has no path-separator boundary, so a `../`-escaped path whose absolute form string-prefixes the base directory passes. An unauthenticated client reads files from sibling paths outside the served directory. ## Details `packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/server.ts`, `getSafeFilePath` (line 2315). The static base is the text before the

    CVE: CVE-2026-59149

  • GHSA-rqx4-3f6q-3x2vHigh
    @Mockoon/commons-server: Unauthenticated admin API + wildcard CORS allows mock-state hijack and secret theft
    • < 9.7.0
    GitHub (opens in a new tab)

    ## Summary Mockoon's admin API ([`commons-server/src/libs/server/admin-api.ts`](https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/blob/4375a8f/packages/commons-server/src/libs/server/admin-api.ts)) is mounted on the same Express listener as the user-defined mock routes, **enabled by default** in every shipped runtime (commons-server, CLI, serverless), serves **`Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` on every endpoint with all HTTP methods allowed including PUT/POST/PATCH/DELETE/PURGE and `Content-Type` in `Access-Control-Allow-Headers`**, and has **zero authentication of any kind** (no token, no shared secret, no

    CVE: CVE-2026-59148

  • GHSA-w7f9-wqc4-3wxrHigh
    Mockoon has a Path Traversal and LFI in the static file serving endpoint
    • < 9.2.0
    GitHub (opens in a new tab)

    ### Summary A mock API configuration for static file serving following the same approach presented in the [documentation page](https://mockoon.com/tutorials/create-endpoint-serving-static-file/), where the server filename is generated via templating features from user input is vulnerable to Path Traversal and LFI, allowing an attacker to get any file in the mock server filesystem. The issue may be particularly relevant in cloud hosted server instances ### Details In `sendFileWithCallback`([code](https://github.com/mockoon/mockoon/blob/1ed31c4059d7f757f6cb2a43e10dc81b0d9c55a9/packages/commons-

    CVE: CVE-2025-59049

Showing 1-3 of 3 vulnerabilities