hulumi-baseline

Ecosystem: npm

Downloads: 156

Vulnerabilities from the last (months)
  • 0CriticalAffects 0 versions
  • 1HighAffects 1 version
  • 0MediumAffects 0 versions
  • 2ModerateAffects 2 versions
  • 0LowAffects 0 versions
Severity distribution (all time)
3vulnerabilities
  • Critical0 (0.0%)
  • High1 (33.3%)
  • Medium0 (0.0%)
  • Moderate2 (66.7%)
  • Low0 (0.0%)

Monthly breakdown

  • Critical
  • High
  • Medium
  • Moderate
  • Low
  • 2 vulnerabilities
    • Critical: 0
    • High: 1
    • Medium: 0
    • Moderate: 1
    • Low: 0
  • 1 vulnerabilities
    • Critical: 0
    • High: 0
    • Medium: 0
    • Moderate: 1
    • Low: 0

Vulnerabilities (3)

Known vulnerabilities affecting hulumi-baseline, based on data from OSV.

Vulnerabilities affecting hulumi-baseline
IDSeveritySummaryAffected versionsPublishedSource
GHSA-2mxr-p26x-mj73High@hulumi/baseline: AccountFoundation audit-delivery S3 bucket could be silently weakened**Affected:** `@hulumi/baseline` `< 1.4.0` — **Fixed in:** `1.4.0` — **Severity:** High — **CWE-1059 (Insufficient Technical Documentation / Behavioral Inconsistency)** #### Summary The S3 bucket that `AccountFoundation` creates to receive CloudTrail and AWS Config audit logs is meant to be tamper-resistant — if someone with delete access can erase from it, the forensic trail is gone. There were three independent ways the protection could be silently weakened: 1. **No Write-Once-Read-Many on the startup-hardened audit bucket.** The startup-hardened tier hard-coded `objectLock: false` on the
  • < 1.4.0
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
GHSA-cj8g-prcm-mfg5Moderate@hulumi/baseline: AccountFoundation reuse paths silently downgrade GuardDuty / Security Hub posture**Affected:** `@hulumi/baseline` `< 1.4.0` — **Fixed in:** `1.4.0` — **Severity:** Medium — **CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure)** #### Summary `AccountFoundation` can either create AWS detective services (GuardDuty for threat detection, Security Hub for compliance dashboards) or reuse pre-existing ones via opt-in flags. The reuse paths just imported the existing resources and reported success — they never checked whether the existing services were actually doing their job. 1. **GuardDuty reuse.** If the existing detector was suspended, or set to the slower 6-hour publishing cadence ins
  • < 1.4.0
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
GHSA-gfp8-mp24-5vxgModerate@hulumi/baseline: CloudTrail selector tampering events were not fully detectedImpact: @hulumi/baseline versions before 1.3.2 could miss some CloudTrail event-selector tampering evidence, reducing coverage for changes to audit logging configuration. Patched in 1.3.2: detection coverage and regression tests were expanded. Remediation: upgrade @hulumi/baseline to 1.3.2 or later and rerun affected previews/checks.
  • < 1.3.2
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
  • GHSA-2mxr-p26x-mj73High
    @hulumi/baseline: AccountFoundation audit-delivery S3 bucket could be silently weakened
    • < 1.4.0

    **Affected:** `@hulumi/baseline` `< 1.4.0` — **Fixed in:** `1.4.0` — **Severity:** High — **CWE-1059 (Insufficient Technical Documentation / Behavioral Inconsistency)** #### Summary The S3 bucket that `AccountFoundation` creates to receive CloudTrail and AWS Config audit logs is meant to be tamper-resistant — if someone with delete access can erase from it, the forensic trail is gone. There were three independent ways the protection could be silently weakened: 1. **No Write-Once-Read-Many on the startup-hardened audit bucket.** The startup-hardened tier hard-coded `objectLock: false` on the

    CVE: CVE-2026-48035

  • GHSA-cj8g-prcm-mfg5Moderate
    @hulumi/baseline: AccountFoundation reuse paths silently downgrade GuardDuty / Security Hub posture
    • < 1.4.0

    **Affected:** `@hulumi/baseline` `< 1.4.0` — **Fixed in:** `1.4.0` — **Severity:** Medium — **CWE-693 (Protection Mechanism Failure)** #### Summary `AccountFoundation` can either create AWS detective services (GuardDuty for threat detection, Security Hub for compliance dashboards) or reuse pre-existing ones via opt-in flags. The reuse paths just imported the existing resources and reported success — they never checked whether the existing services were actually doing their job. 1. **GuardDuty reuse.** If the existing detector was suspended, or set to the slower 6-hour publishing cadence ins

    CVE: CVE-2026-48037

  • GHSA-gfp8-mp24-5vxgModerate
    @hulumi/baseline: CloudTrail selector tampering events were not fully detected
    • < 1.3.2

    Impact: @hulumi/baseline versions before 1.3.2 could miss some CloudTrail event-selector tampering evidence, reducing coverage for changes to audit logging configuration. Patched in 1.3.2: detection coverage and regression tests were expanded. Remediation: upgrade @hulumi/baseline to 1.3.2 or later and rerun affected previews/checks.

    CVE: CVE-2026-82863

Showing 1-3 of 3 vulnerabilities