ep_etherpad-lite

Fix: PR #7905 (ether/etherpad). `getHTMLFromAtext` in `src/node/utils/ExportHtml.ts` interpolates values from the `exportHtmlAdditionalTagsWithData` plugin hook into `span data-<k>="<v>"` without HTML-attribute escaping. The value comes verbatim from the pad attribute pool, which a pad editor controls via a crafted changeset (only `author` attributes are validated; `moveOpsToNewPool` -> `AttributePool.putAttrib` stores any value). With a bundled plugin that registers the hook (ep_font_color / ep_font_size), an attribute value such as `" onload="alert(1)` is exported as `<span data-color="" on

CVE: CVE-2026-55090

Fix: PR #7906 (ether/etherpad). A set of medium/low hardening fixes: - **Weak RNG for tokens (CWE-330):** author/session/readonly IDs were generated with `Math.random()` (client and server). Now use `crypto.getRandomValues`. - **Login timing / no failure delay (CWE-208/CWE-307):** the OIDC interaction login used a non-constant-time password compare with no failure delay. Now uses `crypto.timingSafeEqual` plus a uniform failure delay; user lookup is own-property only. - **Plugin dependency path handling (CWE-22):** plugin dependency names from package.json were used to build filesystem paths w

## Description `src/node/handler/ImportHandler.ts` and `src/node/handler/ExportHandler.ts` both compute their temporary working-file paths as: ```ts const randNum = Math.floor(Math.random() * 0xFFFFFFFF); const srcFile = `${os.tmpdir()}/etherpad_export_${randNum}.html`; const destFile = `${os.tmpdir()}/etherpad_export_${randNum}.${type}`; ``` Two flaws compound: 1. **`Math.random()` is not crypto-secure.** It yields at most ~32 bits of entropy and is **predictable across calls within the same Node process** (V8 shares PRNG state between consecutive `Math.random()` invocations). An attacker

CVE: CVE-2026-55086

# GHSA-03 — `x-proxy-path` header reflected into admin HTML/JS/CSS (cache-poisoning XSS) and concatenated into redirect (open-redirect) **Severity:** Medium **CVSS v3.1 vector:** `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N` **CVSS suggested base score:** ~6.1 — Medium *(Re-validate in the first.gov calculator before filing. Score depends heavily on whether you assume a cooperative cache exists in front of the deployment — single-origin admin-only ops with no shared cache push toward 4.x; cache-poisoning against a CDN pushes toward 7.x.)* **CWE:** CWE-79 Improper Neutralization of Input Du

CVE: CVE-2026-55087

Etherpad's device-to-device author-token transfer endpoint is replayable, never expires, and exposes the cleartext author token in the GET response body ## Description Etherpad ships an endpoint pair under `/tokenTransfer` (`src/node/hooks/express/tokenTransfer.ts`) that lets a logged-in user move their HttpOnly author token to a different browser (typically by scanning a QR code containing the transfer URL). The flow is: 1. **POST `/tokenTransfer`** — the source device sends a request whose own author cookie is read off the server-side cookie jar. The server mints a random UUID and stores

CVE: CVE-2026-55088

`node/hooks/express/apicalls.js` in Etherpad Lite before v1.6.3 mishandles JSONP, which allows remote attackers to bypass intended access restrictions.

CVE: CVE-2018-6835