electerm

### Impact A path traversal vulnerability exists in the Zmodem and Trzsz file download handlers in electerm. When receiving files via Zmodem or Trzsz protocols, electerm uses the remote-supplied filename directly in `path.join()` with the user-selected download directory without sanitization. A malicious SSH server or remote shell process can send a specially crafted filename such as `../escaped.txt` to escape the user-selected download directory and write files to arbitrary locations on the user's filesystem, subject to process permissions. **Attack scenario:** 1. User connects to a malici

CVE: CVE-2026-49253

### Impact A command injection vulnerability exists in electerm's file system operations (`rmrf`, `mv`, `cp`) in `src/app/lib/fs.js`. These functions construct shell commands by interpolating file paths directly into command strings without escaping shell metacharacters. **Vulnerable functions:** - `rmrf()` - Uses `rm -rf "${path}"` (double quotes, vulnerable to `"` injection) - `mv()` - Uses `mv '${from}' '${to}'` (single quotes, vulnerable to `'` injection) - `cp()` - Uses `cp -r "${from}" "${to}"` (double quotes, vulnerable to `"` injection) **Attack scenario:** 1. Attacker controls a ma

CVE: CVE-2026-49255

### Impact _Local code execution without UI interaction: any same-user process can send a JSON payload to electerm's single-instance socket/pipe, causing the app to create tabs and potentially spawn attacker-controlled local processes. Affects electerm single-instance installs on the machine._ ### Patches - https://github.com/electerm/electerm/commit/0599e67069b00e376a2e962649aaad6096e63507 ### Workarounds - Do not run unsafe command ### References - Report / credit: https://github.com/Curly-Haired-Baboon - Electerm releases: https://github.com/electerm/electerm/releases

CVE: CVE-2026-45353

### Impact _Insecure sync encryption: deterministic AES-192-CBC with a fixed zero IV, constant KDF salt, and no MAC leads to confidentiality and integrity failures for synced bookmark/profile data. Attackers can crack common passwords across installs and perform undetected ciphertext bit-flips to alter config/bookmarks._ ### Patches - https://github.com/electerm/electerm/commit/9dd8295e37d53396b980cd45dfc5ed11ad79b937 ### Workarounds - No ### References - Report / credit: https://github.com/Curly-Haired-Baboon - Electerm releases: https://github.com/electerm/electerm/releases

CVE: CVE-2026-45787

### Impact _Persistent local-pty code execution via imported bookmarks or compromised sync targets. Affects users who import bookmark JSON files or who have electerm sync configured (gist/WebDAV). The attacker can inject `exec*` fields or global config to cause remote code to run when a bookmark is opened or when sync is applied._ ### Patches Not yet ### Workarounds - Do not import unsafe data ### References - Report / credit: https://github.com/Curly-Haired-Baboon - Electerm releases: https://github.com/electerm/electerm/releases

CVE: CVE-2026-45058

### Impact The `getConstants()` IPC handler in `src/app/lib/ipc-sync.js` serialises the entire `process.env` object and sends it to the renderer. The data is stored as `window.pre.env` and is accessible from any JavaScript running in the renderer (e.g., via the DevTools console or a compromised webview context). On developer and CI machines, `process.env` routinely contains secrets such as: - `AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY` / `AWS_SESSION_TOKEN` - `GITHUB_TOKEN` / `NPM_TOKEN` - `OPENAI_API_KEY` / `DOCKER_AUTH` - Internal service credentials, API keys, and database URLs An attacker who achieves any

CVE: CVE-2026-43942

### Impact The `runWidget` function in `src/app/widgets/load-widget.js` constructs a file path by directly concatenating user‑supplied widget identifiers without any sanitisation: ```javascript const file = `widget-${widgetId}.js` const widget = require(path.join(__dirname, file)) ``` Because `runWidget` is exposed to the renderer process via an asynchronous IPC handler with no input validation, an attacker who achieves JavaScript execution inside the renderer (for example, through a malicious plugin or a cross‑site scripting flaw in the built‑in webview) can abuse a **path traversal** (`../

CVE: CVE-2026-43940

### Impact Electerm's terminal hyperlink handler passes any URL clicked in the terminal directly to `shell.openExternal` without any protocol validation. When a user connects to a malicious SSH server, the attacker can print a crafted URI in the terminal output. If the victim clicks the link, `shell.openExternal` executes it using the operating system's default protocol handler. This can be abused to: - Trigger dangerous protocol handlers (`ms-msdt:`, `search-ms:`) for code execution - Open local files or network shares (`file://`, UNC paths) to leak NTLM hashes or exfiltrate data - Launch

CVE: CVE-2026-43941

### Impact _Arbitrary local code execution via deep links, CLI `--opts`, or crafted shortcuts. Affected users: electerm installs that accept protocol URLs or CLI options (affected versions listed in the original report). Exploit requires clicking a crafted `electerm://...` link or opening a crafted shortcut/command that launches electerm with attacker-controlled `opts`._ ### Patches Fixed in version > 3.8.8 commits: - https://github.com/electerm/electerm/commit/8a6a17951e96d715f5a231532bbd8303fe208700 - https://github.com/electerm/electerm/commit/a79e06f4a1f0ac6376c3d2411ef4690fa0377742 - h

CVE: CVE-2026-43944

### Impact A code execution (RCE) vulnerability exists in electerm's SFTP open with system editor or "Edit with custom editor" feature. When a user opts to edit a file using open with system editor or open with a custom editor, the filename is passed directly into a command line without sanitization. A malicious actor controlling the SSH server or user OS can exploit this by crafting a filename containing shell metacharacters. If a victim subsequently attempts to edit this file, the injected commands are executed on their machine with the user's privileges. This could allow the attacker to r

CVE: CVE-2026-43943