browse-mcp
Ecosystem: npm
Downloads:
- 0CriticalAffects 0 versions
- 1HighAffects 1 version
- 0MediumAffects 0 versions
- 0ModerateAffects 0 versions
- 0LowAffects 0 versions
1vulnerability
- Critical0 (0.0%)
- High1 (100.0%)
- Medium0 (0.0%)
- Moderate0 (0.0%)
- Low0 (0.0%)
Monthly breakdown
- 1 vulnerabilities
- Critical: 0
- High: 1
- Medium: 0
- Moderate: 0
- Low: 0
Vulnerabilities (1)
Known vulnerabilities affecting browse-mcp, based on data from OSV.
| ID | Severity | Summary | Affected versions | Published | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-m9mq-7m7q-xc6p | High | browse-mcp has an arbitrary file write via unconfined download and state paths### Impact `browser_download` wrote a fetched file to `join(save_dir, filename)` with no validation of `save_dir`, and `browser_save_state` / `browser_load_state` honored an explicit `path` unchanged. The MCP caller controls these arguments (a malicious MCP client, or an autonomous agent steered by indirect prompt injection on a visited page), so an attacker could supply an arbitrary `save_dir` (or state `path`) together with a URL whose response body became the file contents, writing attacker-controlled bytes to any path the process can reach (for example `~/.bashrc`, an autostart entry, or a |
| GitHub (opens in a new tab) |
- GHSA-m9mq-7m7q-xc6pHighbrowse-mcp has an arbitrary file write via unconfined download and state paths
< 0.8.2
### Impact `browser_download` wrote a fetched file to `join(save_dir, filename)` with no validation of `save_dir`, and `browser_save_state` / `browser_load_state` honored an explicit `path` unchanged. The MCP caller controls these arguments (a malicious MCP client, or an autonomous agent steered by indirect prompt injection on a visited page), so an attacker could supply an arbitrary `save_dir` (or state `path`) together with a URL whose response body became the file contents, writing attacker-controlled bytes to any path the process can reach (for example `~/.bashrc`, an autostart entry, or a
CVE: CVE-2026-55557