vite-plus

Ecosystem: npm

Downloads: 14.17 Mln

Vulnerabilities from the last (months)
  • 1CriticalAffects 1 version
  • 2HighAffects 2 versions
  • 0MediumAffects 0 versions
  • 7ModerateAffects 7 versions
  • 1LowAffects 1 version
Severity distribution (all time)
11vulnerabilities
  • Critical1 (9.1%)
  • High2 (18.2%)
  • Medium0 (0.0%)
  • Moderate7 (63.6%)
  • Low1 (9.1%)

Monthly breakdown

  • Critical
  • High
  • Medium
  • Moderate
  • Low
  • 7 vulnerabilities
    • Critical: 0
    • High: 1
    • Medium: 0
    • Moderate: 5
    • Low: 1
  • 3 vulnerabilities
    • Critical: 1
    • High: 0
    • Medium: 0
    • Moderate: 2
    • Low: 0
  • 1 vulnerabilities
    • Critical: 0
    • High: 1
    • Medium: 0
    • Moderate: 0
    • Low: 0

Vulnerabilities (11)

Known vulnerabilities affecting vite-plus, based on data from OSV.

Vulnerabilities affecting vite-plus
IDSeveritySummaryAffected versionsPublishedSource
GHSA-9jrq-w75r-8gcwLowVite: Cross origin script execution through Vite custom middleware### Summary When accessing a malicious site while a dev server using Vite is running, that site was able to load scripts in a page served by the dev server. ### Impact Only apps that match the following conditions are affected: - the dev server passes an unchanged browser request URL to `server.transformIndexHtml`: this is normally used for `server.middlewareMode: true` or `appType: 'custom'`. The internal call for `appType: 'spa'` and `appType: 'mpa'` does not match this. - the transformed HTML contains an inline module script - from the script in the page served by the dev server, the ap
  • < 1.1.0
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
GHSA-p458-7748-mcp3ModerateVitest: Servers misapply `server.fs.deny`, serving `.env`, private keys, `.git`, and the API token file### Summary In Vitest 5, Vite's `server.fs.deny` is not applied as intended on Vitest's dev servers. Depending on the server, files that Vite refuses to serve by default (such as `.env`, private keys and certificates, `.npmrc`, and `.git`) or Vitest's own API token file (`.vitest-secret-token`) can be read over plain HTTP by a client that can reach the server. In Browser Mode with `test.projects`, a malicious website can also read `.env` values through the developer's browser. This only applies when Vitest runs an HTTP server, which happens with the UI (`--ui`), Browser Mode, or `api` enable
  • >= 1.0.0-rc.0, < 1.3.0
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22ModerateVite: Files outside `server.fs.allow` could be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machine### Summary The content of files outside `server.fs` setting can be returned to the browser if the project imports a file path concatenated with the `root`. For example, if the project references `<path-to-project-root>/etc/hosts`, the content of `/etc/hosts` was possible to be returned. The content of files outside the `server.fs.allow` option can be returned to the browser when a project imports a file whose root-relative path matches an absolute path on the host. For example, referencing `<project-root>/etc/hosts` could make Vite return the host's `/etc/hosts` file. ### Impact Only apps
  • < 1.1.0
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
GHSA-vfpm-58rq-9qcgModerateVite: First 4 bytes of files outside of `server.fs` setting is exposed by `?vite-wasm-instance`### Summary The first 4 bytes of files outside of `server.fs` setting can be returned to the browser by a request containing `?vite-wasm-instance`. ### Impact Only apps that match one of the following conditions are affected: - explicitly expose the Vite dev server to the network using `--host` or the [`server.host`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-host) option - there's a file that has a sensitive information in **the first 4 bytes** - uses Node.js or Deno to run Vite (if Bun is used, it is not affected) ### Details Requests containing the `?vite-wasm-instance` query are h
  • >= 0.2.8, < 1.1.0
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pmHighlaunch-editor: `fs.existsSync()` existence check can be bypassed on Windows### Summary `launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename. Combined with the `%` escaping issue described in [GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv](https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/security/advisories/GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv), this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument. ### Impact Only apps that runs on Windows i
  • < 1.1.0
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcvModeratelaunch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows### Summary `launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed. ### Impact Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected: - The user uses Windows - An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%` - Either of - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed ### Details Unlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` file
  • < 1.1.0
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxwModeratelaunch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors### Summary `launch-editor` forwarded file paths directly to editors without sanitization. If a path resembles a CLI flag, editors like Vim may interpret it as a command, potentially causing unintended file overwrites or command execution. ### Impact #### Direct `launch-editor` users Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected: - The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with `+` or `-` in the working directory - The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors: - Vim (including gVim) - MacVim - Emacs
  • < 1.1.0
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
GHSA-fx2h-pf6j-xcffModeratevite: `server.fs.deny` bypass on Windows alternate paths### Summary The contents of files that are specified by [`server.fs.deny`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-deny) can be returned to the browser on Windows. ### Impact Only apps that match the following conditions are affected: - explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host` or [`server.host` config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) - the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by [`server.fs.allow`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-allow) - either of: - the sensitive file exists
  • < 0.1.24
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
GHSA-g8mr-85jm-7xhmCriticalVitest Browser: Exposed Browser Mode API Can Proxy CDP and Overwrite Config Files, Leading to RCE## Summary Vitest Browser Mode exposes a `cdp()` API that forwards raw Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) methods over the Vitest browser WebSocket RPC. CDP is not gated by `browser.api.allowWrite`, `browser.api.allowExec`, `api.allowWrite`, or `api.allowExec`. As a result, disabling Browser Mode write and exec operations does not prevent a browser API client from using CDP to perform equivalent actions. In a verified reproduction with `allowWrite: false` and `allowExec: false`, CDP `Page.setDownloadBehavior` set the browser download directory to the project root, and CDP `Runtime.evaluate` down
  • < 0.1.24
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3Moderatelaunch-editor: NTLMv2 hash disclosure via UNC path handling on Windows### Summary The `launch-editor` NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking. ### Impact If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the `launch-editor`: - using Windows - NTLM is not disabled ([it is recommended to disable](https://techcommunity.m
  • < 0.1.24
GitHub (opens in a new tab)
  • GHSA-9jrq-w75r-8gcwLow
    Vite: Cross origin script execution through Vite custom middleware
    • < 1.1.0

    ### Summary When accessing a malicious site while a dev server using Vite is running, that site was able to load scripts in a page served by the dev server. ### Impact Only apps that match the following conditions are affected: - the dev server passes an unchanged browser request URL to `server.transformIndexHtml`: this is normally used for `server.middlewareMode: true` or `appType: 'custom'`. The internal call for `appType: 'spa'` and `appType: 'mpa'` does not match this. - the transformed HTML contains an inline module script - from the script in the page served by the dev server, the ap

    CVE: CVE-2026-112945

  • GHSA-p458-7748-mcp3Moderate
    Vitest: Servers misapply `server.fs.deny`, serving `.env`, private keys, `.git`, and the API token file
    • >= 1.0.0-rc.0, < 1.3.0

    ### Summary In Vitest 5, Vite's `server.fs.deny` is not applied as intended on Vitest's dev servers. Depending on the server, files that Vite refuses to serve by default (such as `.env`, private keys and certificates, `.npmrc`, and `.git`) or Vitest's own API token file (`.vitest-secret-token`) can be read over plain HTTP by a client that can reach the server. In Browser Mode with `test.projects`, a malicious website can also read `.env` values through the developer's browser. This only applies when Vitest runs an HTTP server, which happens with the UI (`--ui`), Browser Mode, or `api` enable

    CVE: CVE-2026-112948

  • GHSA-rq7h-c2jc-7f22Moderate
    Vite: Files outside `server.fs.allow` could be served when project paths match system paths on non-Windows machine
    • < 1.1.0

    ### Summary The content of files outside `server.fs` setting can be returned to the browser if the project imports a file path concatenated with the `root`. For example, if the project references `<path-to-project-root>/etc/hosts`, the content of `/etc/hosts` was possible to be returned. The content of files outside the `server.fs.allow` option can be returned to the browser when a project imports a file whose root-relative path matches an absolute path on the host. For example, referencing `<project-root>/etc/hosts` could make Vite return the host's `/etc/hosts` file. ### Impact Only apps

    CVE: CVE-2026-112946

  • GHSA-vfpm-58rq-9qcgModerate
    Vite: First 4 bytes of files outside of `server.fs` setting is exposed by `?vite-wasm-instance`
    • >= 0.2.8, < 1.1.0

    ### Summary The first 4 bytes of files outside of `server.fs` setting can be returned to the browser by a request containing `?vite-wasm-instance`. ### Impact Only apps that match one of the following conditions are affected: - explicitly expose the Vite dev server to the network using `--host` or the [`server.host`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-host) option - there's a file that has a sensitive information in **the first 4 bytes** - uses Node.js or Deno to run Vite (if Bun is used, it is not affected) ### Details Requests containing the `?vite-wasm-instance` query are h

    CVE: CVE-2026-112947

  • GHSA-587h-7wmj-h5pmHigh
    launch-editor: `fs.existsSync()` existence check can be bypassed on Windows
    • < 1.1.0

    ### Summary `launch-editor` checked `fs.existsSync(fileName)` before passing a supplied path to an editor command. On Windows, an attacker can bypass this check with a crafted path ending in `\\..:line:column`. This removes the requirement that the attacker be able to place a file with a malicious filename. Combined with the `%` escaping issue described in [GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv](https://github.com/vitejs/launch-editor/security/advisories/GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcv), this bypass can lead to OS command injection when an attacker controls the file argument. ### Impact Only apps that runs on Windows i

    CVE: CVE-2026-112942

  • GHSA-698v-4r3x-3vcvModerate
    launch-editor: escapeCmdArgs() omits % escaping on Windows
    • < 1.1.0

    ### Summary `launch-editor` did not escape `%` on Windows when passing an argument to `cmd`. When an environment variable contained a malicious value, it was possible that that content to be executed. ### Impact Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected: - The user uses Windows - An attacker can place a file with the malicious filename containing `&` or `%` - Either of - An attacker can inject an environment variable with a malicious value - An attacker can add a NTFS alternate data stream to the file placed ### Details Unlike `.sh` files, `.bat` / `.cmd` file

    CVE: CVE-2026-112943

  • GHSA-r825-w8mm-5pxwModerate
    launch-editor: Editor CLI flag misinterpretation causing arbitrary command execution for some editors
    • < 1.1.0

    ### Summary `launch-editor` forwarded file paths directly to editors without sanitization. If a path resembles a CLI flag, editors like Vim may interpret it as a command, potentially causing unintended file overwrites or command execution. ### Impact #### Direct `launch-editor` users Only apps that match all of the following conditions are affected: - The attacker is able to create a file system entry (e.g. a file or directory) starting with `+` or `-` in the working directory - The user uses or the app specifies any of the following editors: - Vim (including gVim) - MacVim - Emacs

    CVE: CVE-2026-112944

  • GHSA-fx2h-pf6j-xcffModerate
    vite: `server.fs.deny` bypass on Windows alternate paths
    • < 0.1.24

    ### Summary The contents of files that are specified by [`server.fs.deny`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-deny) can be returned to the browser on Windows. ### Impact Only apps that match the following conditions are affected: - explicitly exposes the Vite dev server to the network (using `--host` or [`server.host` config option](https://vitejs.dev/config/server-options.html#server-host)) - the sensitive file exists in the allowed directories specified by [`server.fs.allow`](https://vite.dev/config/server-options#server-fs-allow) - either of: - the sensitive file exists

    CVE: CVE-2026-53571

  • GHSA-g8mr-85jm-7xhmCritical
    Vitest Browser: Exposed Browser Mode API Can Proxy CDP and Overwrite Config Files, Leading to RCE
    • < 0.1.24

    ## Summary Vitest Browser Mode exposes a `cdp()` API that forwards raw Chrome DevTools Protocol (CDP) methods over the Vitest browser WebSocket RPC. CDP is not gated by `browser.api.allowWrite`, `browser.api.allowExec`, `api.allowWrite`, or `api.allowExec`. As a result, disabling Browser Mode write and exec operations does not prevent a browser API client from using CDP to perform equivalent actions. In a verified reproduction with `allowWrite: false` and `allowExec: false`, CDP `Page.setDownloadBehavior` set the browser download directory to the project root, and CDP `Runtime.evaluate` down

    CVE: CVE-2026-53633

  • GHSA-v6wh-96g9-6wx3Moderate
    launch-editor: NTLMv2 hash disclosure via UNC path handling on Windows
    • < 0.1.24

    ### Summary The `launch-editor` NPM package accesses arbitrary paths including Windows UNC paths. When a UNC path is opened, Windows automatically attempts NTLM authentication to the remote host, causing the user’s NTLMv2 password hash to be leaked to an attacker-controlled SMB server. This can result in credential compromise through offline hash cracking. ### Impact If the following conditions are met, an attacker can get the NTLMv2 password hash on the computer that is using the `launch-editor`: - using Windows - NTLM is not disabled ([it is recommended to disable](https://techcommunity.m

    CVE: CVE-2026-53632

Showing 1-10 of 11 vulnerabilities