jodit

A `<script>` element placed directly inside an `<svg>` (or MathML) container was not removed by Jodit's clean-html sanitizer. The deny/allow tag filter compared `node.nodeName` against an upper-cased tag hash, but foreign (SVG/MathML) elements preserve their original-case node names — an SVG script reports `"script"`, not `"SCRIPT"` — so the default `denyTags` list (which includes `script`) did not match it. The script therefore survived in the editor value and serialized output, where it could execute when the content was loaded back into a page or editor. ### Proof of concept ```html <svg

CVE: CVE-2026-65841

### Summary `Jodit.configure(options)` — and the internal `ConfigMerge` / `ConfigProto` helpers — merged user-supplied options into the editor configuration without filtering prototype-mutating keys. A payload nested under an existing plain-object option such as `controls` could reach and mutate `Object.prototype` (prototype pollution). ### Affected - Package: `jodit` (npm) - Versions: `< 4.12.18` - Public API: `Jodit.configure(options)` ### Proof of Concept ```js import { Jodit } from 'jodit'; delete Object.prototype.polluted; Jodit.configure(JSON.parse('{"controls":{"__proto__":{"polluted"

CVE: CVE-2026-54756

### Summary jodit's `sanitizeHTMLElement` neutralizes a `javascript:` `href` using a bare `href.trim().indexOf('javascript') === 0` check. This omits the normalization jodit applies to every other URL attribute: `isDangerousUrl` strips control bytes with `value.replace(/[\u0000-\u0020]+/g, '')` and lowercases the value before testing the scheme. Because the `href` check does neither, it is bypassed by three obfuscation classes, all confirmed firing on click against the shipped 4.12.30 build: 1. Case variants: `JAVASCRIPT:`, `Javascript:`, `jaVaScRiPt:` (the check is case-sensitive). 2. A lea

CVE: CVE-2026-62324

### Summary jodit's built-in `clean-html` sanitizer can be bypassed by a MathML/`<style>` carrier that hides a dangerous element from the sanitizer's element walk, so a no-interaction event handler survives into the editor value. When an application supplies attacker-influenced HTML to the editor's value-set or insertion paths, the sanitized output still contains a live `<img ... onload=...>` (or another non-`onerror` handler such as `onfocus`). A consumer that renders that output (`element.innerHTML = editor.value`) executes the handler with no user interaction. This is a stored cross-site sc

CVE: CVE-2026-58263

### Summary `Jodit.modules.Helpers.set(chain, value, obj)` walks the dot-separated `chain`, creating and following each path segment, without filtering prototype-mutating keys. A chain that begins with (or contains) `__proto__`, `constructor`, or `prototype` lets the final assignment reach and mutate `Object.prototype` (prototype pollution). ### Affected - Package: `jodit` (npm) - Versions: `< 4.12.26` - Public API: `Jodit.modules.Helpers.set(chain, value, obj)` ### Proof of Concept ```js const { Jodit } = require('jodit'); delete Object.prototype.polluted; Jodit.modules.Helpers.set('__proto

CVE: CVE-2026-55886

Jodit Editor is a WYSIWYG editor written in pure TypeScript without the use of additional libraries. Jodit Editor is vulnerable to XSS attacks when pasting specially constructed input. This issue has not been fully patched. There are no known workarounds.

CVE: CVE-2022-23461