fastify

### Impact Fastify lowercases header names in a `headers` schema before compilation, because Node.js stores request header names in lowercase. This normalization does not reach the header names held in a `propertyNames` subschema's `enum` and `const`. A header-name deny-list written in the canonical header case, such as `propertyNames: { not: { enum: ['X-Debug-Override'] } }`, therefore never matches the lowercased request headers, and the forbidden header reaches the handler. Any application that uses a `propertyNames` deny-list or allow-list to constrain request header names does not get th

CVE: CVE-2026-107832

### Impact `fastify` crashes with an uncaught `ERR_HTTP2_INVALID_CONNECTION_HEADERS` exception when a route that registers a response trailer via `reply.trailer()` is served over HTTP/2. Fastify unconditionally adds the `Transfer-Encoding: chunked` header when a trailer is set, which is forbidden on HTTP/2, so Node.js throws while serializing the response headers. The exception is not caught and becomes an uncaughtException, terminating the Node.js process. One unauthenticated HTTP/2 request to any route that uses trailers is enough to crash the server, dropping all in-flight requests, and t

CVE: CVE-2026-92081

### Impact Fastify runs a route's validator and, for a result shaped like `{ value, error }`, unwraps it: an `error` becomes a validation failure and `value` replaces the request part. This convention is intended for synchronous custom compilers (for example Joi). A JSON Schema `$async` validator, however, resolves with the validated data itself, so Fastify applied the same unwrapping to it. If a request part validated by an `$async` schema contains a `value` property, Fastify replaced the whole request part with that nested value before the handler ran, so a `value` or `error` property in th

CVE: CVE-2026-84504

### Impact Fastify lowercases header-schema property names before compiling the schema, because Node.js stores request header names in lowercase. That normalization was incomplete: it lowercased only top-level `properties` keys and the root `required` array, and did not lowercase the JSON Schema Draft 7 `dependencies` keyword (its trigger keys and dependent property names) or names in nested subschemas. As a result, a header schema that uses `dependencies` to require one header when another is present (for example `X-Admin` requiring `X-Admin-Token`) never matches the lowercased request heade

CVE: CVE-2026-84428

### Impact Fastify decided whether to validate a request part by checking its schema for JavaScript truthiness. JSON Schema Draft 7 defines the boolean `false` as a valid schema that rejects every instance, but because `false` is falsy, a route that set `body`, `querystring`, `params`, or `headers` to `false` had that part left uncompiled: no validator was attached and the request reached the handler. An application that used `false` as a deny-all schema to make a route unreachable was therefore fully bypassed, and an unauthenticated remote client could reach the handler with any input. The s

CVE: CVE-2026-84469

### Impact Fastify routes a malformed URL under one plugin prefix to the custom not-found handler of a different sibling plugin, invoking the handler registered last and skipping the `preHandler` declared in its `setNotFoundHandler()`. When the request method has no route in the main router, a malformed request target reaches Fastify's internal not-found router before URL decoding and is dispatched through a single shared handler pointer, regardless of prefix and without the normal request lifecycle. An unauthenticated request to a public prefix can therefore reach an authentication-protected

CVE: CVE-2026-76169

## Impact The fix for [CVE-2026-3635](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-3635) ([GHSA-444r-cwp2-x5xf](https://github.com/fastify/fastify/security/advisories/GHSA-444r-cwp2-x5xf)) added a `proxyFn(socket.remoteAddress, 0)` guard on the `X-Forwarded-*` reads in `request.host`, `request.protocol`, `request.hostname`, `request.ip`, and `request.ips`. That guard closes the IP, CIDR, and custom-function forms of `trustProxy` correctly because those forms compile to predicates that inspect the connecting address. The hop-count form (`trustProxy: <number>`) compiles to a predicate that structu

CVE: CVE-2026-16732

### Impact `fastify` before 5.12.1, when a route uses a root-level primitive body schema (for example an integer with a minimum and maximum) and the default type coercion, validates the coerced value but exposes the original, uncoerced value to the route handler. For example, a JSON body `"10"` is coerced to the number `10` and passes an integer 1 to 10 schema, but `request.body` stays the string `"10"`. An application that trusts the validated type is handed a value that did not satisfy the schema, which can bypass limits the application enforces on that typed value. Object and array body sc

CVE: CVE-2026-18504

### Summary A validation bypass vulnerability exists in Fastify v5.x where request body validation schemas specified via `schema.body.content` can be completely circumvented by prepending a single space character (`\x20`) to the `Content-Type` header. The body is still parsed correctly as JSON (or any other content type), but schema validation is entirely skipped. This is a regression introduced by commit [`f3d2bcb`](https://github.com/fastify/fastify/commit/f3d2bcb3963cd570a582e5d39aab01a9ae692fe4) (fix for [CVE-2025-32442](https://github.com/fastify/fastify/security/advisories/GHSA-mg2h-6x62

CVE: CVE-2025-32442

## Summary When `trustProxy` is configured with a restrictive trust function (e.g., a specific IP like `trustProxy: '10.0.0.1'`, a subnet, a hop count, or a custom function), the `request.protocol` and `request.host` getters read `X-Forwarded-Proto` and `X-Forwarded-Host` headers from any connection — including connections from untrusted IPs. This allows an attacker connecting directly to Fastify (bypassing the proxy) to spoof both the protocol and host seen by the application. ## Affected Versions fastify <= 5.8.2 ## Impact Applications using `request.protocol` or `request.host` for secu

CVE: CVE-2026-3635