2vulnerabilities
- Critical0 (0.0%)
- High0 (0.0%)
- Medium0 (0.0%)
- Moderate2 (100.0%)
- Low0 (0.0%)
chrome-devtools-mcp
Ecosystem: npm
Downloads: 8.51 Mln
- 0CriticalAffects 0 versions
- 0HighAffects 0 versions
- 0MediumAffects 0 versions
- 2ModerateAffects 2 versions
- 0LowAffects 0 versions
Monthly breakdown
- Critical
- High
- Medium
- Moderate
- Low
- 1 vulnerabilities
- Critical: 0
- High: 0
- Medium: 0
- Moderate: 1
- Low: 0
- 1 vulnerabilities
- Critical: 0
- High: 0
- Medium: 0
- Moderate: 1
- Low: 0
Vulnerabilities (2)
Known vulnerabilities affecting chrome-devtools-mcp, based on data from OSV.
| ID | Severity | Summary | Affected versions | Published | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GHSA-8qf9-62x2-82pp | Moderate | chrome-devtools-mcp: validatePath() does not canonicalize symlinks before enforcing roots### Summary I originally reported this through Google Bug Hunters. The Google Bug Hunters team said this is in OSS VRP scope but not reward-eligible due to the project tier, and asked me to file an issue or PR directly with this repository. I am reporting it privately here first because it is an unfixed security issue. `McpContext.validatePath()` enforces workspace `roots` by checking whether `path.resolve(filePath)` textually falls under one of the configured root paths. `path.resolve()` does not canonicalize symbolic links. As a result, a symlink inside a configured workspace root can poin |
| GitHub (opens in a new tab) | |
| GHSA-3pvj-jv98-qhjq | Moderate | Chrome DevTools for agents: daemon.pid write follows symlinks in /tmp fallback runtime directory### Summary The chrome-devtools-mcp daemon writes its PID file with `fs.writeFileSync()` to a deterministic runtime path. On typical macOS environments, and on Linux sessions where `$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR` is unset, that runtime path falls back to `/tmp/chrome-devtools-mcp-<uid>/daemon.pid`. Because the write does not use `O_NOFOLLOW`, a local low-privilege user on the same POSIX host can pre-create `/tmp/chrome-devtools-mcp-<victim_uid>/daemon.pid` as a symlink to a file writable by the victim. When the victim later starts daemon mode, `fs.writeFileSync()` follows the symlink and truncates the ta |
| GitHub (opens in a new tab) |
- GHSA-8qf9-62x2-82ppModeratechrome-devtools-mcp: validatePath() does not canonicalize symlinks before enforcing roots
>= 0.24.0, < 1.1.0
### Summary I originally reported this through Google Bug Hunters. The Google Bug Hunters team said this is in OSS VRP scope but not reward-eligible due to the project tier, and asked me to file an issue or PR directly with this repository. I am reporting it privately here first because it is an unfixed security issue. `McpContext.validatePath()` enforces workspace `roots` by checking whether `path.resolve(filePath)` textually falls under one of the configured root paths. `path.resolve()` does not canonicalize symbolic links. As a result, a symlink inside a configured workspace root can poin
CVE: CVE-2026-53766
- GHSA-3pvj-jv98-qhjqModerateChrome DevTools for agents: daemon.pid write follows symlinks in /tmp fallback runtime directory
>= 0.20.0, < 1.1.0
### Summary The chrome-devtools-mcp daemon writes its PID file with `fs.writeFileSync()` to a deterministic runtime path. On typical macOS environments, and on Linux sessions where `$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR` is unset, that runtime path falls back to `/tmp/chrome-devtools-mcp-<uid>/daemon.pid`. Because the write does not use `O_NOFOLLOW`, a local low-privilege user on the same POSIX host can pre-create `/tmp/chrome-devtools-mcp-<victim_uid>/daemon.pid` as a symlink to a file writable by the victim. When the victim later starts daemon mode, `fs.writeFileSync()` follows the symlink and truncates the ta
CVE: CVE-2026-53765